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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between an auditor’s characteristics and the incidence rate 
of its client subject to the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release. Using the sample of 
AAERs from 2002 to 2006, we find that when a firm is audited from a large accounting firm, there 
is a significantly less incidence rate subject to AAERs. Also, we find that the audit time of AAERs 
firms is significantly less than that of non-AAERs firms. Because AAER is related with audit 
quality, it implies that AAER depends on audit time and audit firm size, and that a firm is affected 
by the incidence rate of subjects toward AAERs. However, there is no difference between the audit 
fee of AAERs firms audit fee and that of non-AAERs firms. Although audit time leads to a high 
audit fee, audit firms are very competitive and therefore, there are some limitations with receiving 
a high audit fee according to audit time. Therefore, the audit fee is significantly affected by the 
incidence rate of subjects toward AAERs. Additionally, we also examine the effectiveness of 
AAERs and the difference of audit efforts depending on the cause of AAERs and the degree of 
penalties imposed by FSS. Overall, the results suggest that depending on the auditor’s 
characteristics, such as the size of accounting firm, audit time, and audit fee, a company is 
affected by the incidence rate subject to AAERs. 
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1. INTORODUTION 
 
or the past 30 years, Korea’s average growth rates have been 4 to 6 percentages. Currently, Koreas is 
13
th
 in the world’s economic ranking. However, with this anomalous economic growth, Korea has 
experienced growing pains. Even though Korea’s economy grew quite rapidly, the social systems and 
conditions needed for such growth were not established. Therefore, during the 20
th
 century, Korea experienced huge 
accounting frauds of big companies, such as SK and Daewoo. Such accounting frauds are very similar with those of 
Enron, Global Crossing, Halliburton, and Harken. Those accounting frauds were related with big accounting firms, 
such as Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, and in the Korea case, Sandong and Chungwoon. The role of the auditor is 
to provide reliable and transparent financial statements to the public. However, in those scandals, the auditor teamed 
up with the client in order to make an accounting fraud, thereby ruining the reliabilities of accounting information. 
After such scandals, the needs of accounting reliabilities become much more important. Therefore, the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS, a SEC equivalent in Korea) now requests a company to follow the FSS’s disclosure 
requirements to minimize fraud opportunities. FSS also engenders more strict enforcement action in order to 
increase and recover the reliability of accounting information as well as to detect any accounting fraud after 
accounting scandals. 
 
Every year, the FSS selects a company randomly or according to its own standards and investigates the 
sample firm’s financial statement; it then releases the results of the enforcement action to the public and imposes 
punishment to the manager and/or auditor who audited the company, subject to the FSS Accounting and Auditing 
F 
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Enforcement Release (hereafter, AAERs firm). Depending on the magnitude and contents of the results of 
enforcement action, an AAERs firm is assigned a new auditor by FSS or has to pay penalties. In some serious 
circumstances, the AAERs firm’s manager can by accused by the FSS. Then, the AAERs firm’s independence 
auditor also has to pay a fine or suffer the deprivation of his/her license. Moreover, the AAERs firm and auditor also 
has to bear expenses such as legal fees, specific sanction fees, and loss of own reputation after subject to AAERs. 
Likewise, enforcement action is an importance system for retaining the credibility of disclosed accounting 
information by re-testifying the audited financial statements. 
 
Therefore, in the realm of accounting, there are many studies regarding the enforcement action related to 
earnings management (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Beneish, 1999; Efendi et al., 2007; Feng et al., 2011). 
Previous literatures have mostly investigated the characteristics of AAER firms and then extended to which AAERs 
firms engage in earnings management. Ferzol et al. (1991) examine the type of accounting problems that induce 
SEC enforcement action, and demonstrate that about 70% of violations consist of the overstatement of receivable 
and inventory resulting from premature revenue recognition and delayed write-offs. Also, Dechow et al. (1996) 
provide evidence that AAERs firms have higher total accruals and discretionary accruals compared to non-AAERs 
firms during the manipulation period. 
 
Likewise, there are much research evidences suggesting that AAERs firms engage in earning management. 
While, there are few research evidences that focus on the AAER’s independence auditor’s role and characteristics, 
even after big accounting scandals. Most companies and managers lack the accounting knowledge and resource to 
create a suitable financial statement. In fact, many companies rely on the auditor to make the financial statement and 
take advice from the auditor before make any accounting decision. Therefore, auditors indirectly affect the financial 
statement prior to doing their real job. In this circumstance, companies have a high level of reliance on auditors 
when they make an accounting decision or make a financial statement. A high level of reliance on the auditor 
implies that the auditor highly affects the quality of the financial statements. More specifically, due to the high 
reliance of the auditor, depending on the auditor’s characteristics such as auditor’s independence, auditor’s efforts, 
and audit firm size, the quality of its client’s financial statement can be changed. According to previous studies, audit 
firm size and auditor effort affect the audit quality by decreasing discretionary accruals (DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic 
& Stain, 1986). Thus, if the audit quality is affected by the auditor’s characteristic depending on the auditor’s 
characteristic, its client also has a difference incidence rate subject to AAERs. 
 
Therefore, in this study, we focus on the characteristics of auditors, audit firm size, auditor’s independence, 
and auditor’s effort by analyzing the auditor who audited AAER firms; further, we investigate which factors can 
significantly reduce the incidence rate of its client subject to AAERs firm. To examine the relation between auditor’s 
characteristic and the incidence rate of its client subject to AAERs, we use audit firm size, auditor time, and audit fee 
as proxies for measuring the auditor’s efforts and auditor’s independence. 
 
In this study, we use the same sample with FSS from 2002 to 2006. In this sample, 88 companies subject to 
AAERs and 631 companies not subject to AAERs were used. According to the samples, we find that firms audited 
by the Big 4 has a significantly low incidence rate subject to AAERs; further, audit time is also significantly related 
with the incidence rate subject to AAERs. Those findings are consistent with the findings of previous literature, that 
Big 4 and audit efforts positively affect the audit quality. Additionally, we investigate the change of audit time and 
fee after being subject to AAERs. We find that after being subject to AAERs, the audit fee significantly increases, 
whereas the audit time does not. This result implies that even though their client is subject to AAERs, the auditors do 
not place more efforts to improve the quality of its financial statement, but rather receive an additional premium in 
order to protect themselves from audit risk. Furthermore, we classify AAER cases in accordance with the cause of 
AAERs and seriousness penalties of AAERs. We find that regardless of the causes of AAERs, auditors invested less 
time when its client is subject to AAERs. More specifically, when AAER firm, which has auditor’s failure, the 
auditor invested less time compared to AAER firm, which has officer’s failure. 
 
This study makes four main contributions. First, we focus on the characteristics of the auditor auditing an 
AAERs firm by examining the reasons of AAERs, not the client’s characteristics. Through this investigation, we 
provide evidence that AAERs is not only the fault of the AAERs firm’s manager, but also the lack of auditors’ efforts. 
Second, we investigate the change of audit time and fee after the auditor’s client is subjects AAERs in order to 
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examine the effectiveness of enforcement action. Third, many previous literature examine the company’s 
characteristic and market reaction at the time of disclosing AAERs information to the public. Normally, the results 
of AAERs are disclosed 3 years later after the firms have released their financial statement. In this study, instead of 
using the enforcement released date, we roll back to the time of issuing the financial statements for providing 
accurate evidence of the auditor’s influence of possibility subject to its client’s AAERs. Lastly, FSS discloses only 
the list of firms subject to AAERs. For this reason, in previous literatures, AAERs firms are compared with the 
authors’ randomly selected firms. However, as we use the same sample with FSS’s AAERs sample, we provide more 
accurate results than other previous studies. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and hypothesis 
development. Section 3 explains the empirical framework and Section 4 describes the data and descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 examines the empirical results. Section 6 examines the additional analysis and finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Korea’s Enforcement Action 
 
Until 1997, many companies conducted earnings management and fraud according to the manager’s 
intention (Choi & Beak, 1998). Companies and the government did not care about enforcement action for providing 
reliable accounting information because they were more focused on a rapid economic growth. However, after the 
international financial crisis in 1997, FSS became more concerned about enforcement action in order to recover the 
credibility, reliability, and transparency of financial statements to the public both domestically and internationally. 
 
In Korea, FSS first initiated enforcement action in 1990. At that time, FSS investigated 312 firms, and 67 
firms were subject to AAERs. During 1991 to 1997, FSS usually investigated 117 to 140 companies, and the rate of 
AAERs firm was 25 to 35% of the total sample. However, in 1998 and 1999, the rate of AAERs firm was increased 
by 45 to 48%. This implies that after the international financial crisis, the reliability and transparency of financial 
statements became a social issue; hence, FSS began to investigate a firm’s financial statement more severely than 
ever before. 
 
Moreover, in 1999, FSS developed its system by disclosing its standard for selecting a sample of AAERs. 
First, FSS selected firms using the following list: 1) Highest debt ratio compared with the same industry 2) Highest 
inventory/asset ratio compared with the same industry 3) Highest operating cash flows compared with the same 
industry 4) IPO company, which is not audited before IPO 5) Comparison with total asset and sales, highly changed 
cost of capital due to accounting change. Next, some ratios of samples are selected using the following list. 1) A 
company that has not selected an AAERs sample during the last 5 years. 2) A company that has changed its 
accounting choice. 3) A company that has at least 1% of operating income and operating loss compared with total 
income. Lastly, FSS selects firms on a random basis. However, FSS excludes firms from the sample. If a company is 
delisting, we include an AAERs sample during the last 3 years or if it has a qualified opinion of audit firm. 
 
By using FSS’s own selecting standards, FSS investigates doubtful companies’ financial statements 
regardless of whether those financial statements have material mistakes, such as fraud and earning management. 
Moreover, similar to SEC enforcement action, FSS also imposes penalties on firms that have some material mistakes, 
depending on the degree of misconducts, by using quantitatively as well as qualitatively information. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Managers first have the responsibility to make financial statements, whereas auditors have duties to detect 
and discover the material mistakes of the financial statements and recommend modifying the mistakes prior to the 
release of the financial statements to the public. However, according to Choi and Baek (1998), up until the 
international financial crisis, most of the reasons subject to AAERs were regarding the manager’s intended earnings 
management under the connivance of auditors. This implies that if an auditor provides high quality audit service 
according to its duties, the auditor has a high possibility to detect its client’s mistakes or intended earnings 
management before its clients are subject to AAERs. Overall, the auditor’s role is very important for reducing or 
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detecting material mistakes in the financial statement as well as any intended earnings management by managers. 
Therefore, in this study, we focus on the relation between the auditor’s characteristics, affecting audit quality and the 
incidence rate of its clients subject to AAERs. 
 
2.2.1 Audit Firm Size and the Incidence Rate of Subject its Client to AAERs 
 
DeAngelo (1981) posits that large audit firms have more incentives to issue an accurate report because 
large auditors have more valuable reputation and have more expertise compared to small audit firms. Generally, the 
previous literatures explain that Big 4 auditors supply higher audit quality compared to non-Big 4 auditors because 
the Big 4 face greater reputation and/or litigation costs from audit failure compared to non-Big 4 auditors (Dopuch 
& Simunic, 1982; Simunic & Stein, 1987; Watkins et al., 2004; Francis, 2004). Also, the size of audit firms is related 
to the type of clients that the audit firm accepts. Large audit firms build their own quality control systems, which are 
defined as involving a greater level of reviews to screen out risky clients and those having going-concern or huge 
law suits (Defond et al., 1997; Raghunandan et al., 1999). Therefore, large audit firms can reject risky clients and 
accept suitable clients compared to small audit firms. Such quality control of accounting firms are also one of the 
reasons as to why large accounting firms provide a higher quality of audit service compared to small accounting 
firms. From those previous literatures, there are consistent results implying that larger audit firms provide higher 
quality audits and offer greater credibility to clients’ financial statements than small audit firms. 
 
AAER is highly related with audit quality. Therefore, we expect that when a firm is audited by a large audit 
firm, the firm has less incidence rate subject to AAERs. In this study, we use the size of audit firms as a proxy for 
high quality auditing. To test our expectation, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms audited by large accounting firms have significantly less incidence rate subject to AAERs 
than firms audited by small accounting firms. 
 
2.2.2 Audit Efforts and the Incidence Subject to AAERs 
 
We additionally use audit time and audit fee as proxies for measuring auditor’s efforts. Although the size of 
audit firm is an important factor of audit quality, depending on the auditor’s efforts, the audit quality can be changed. 
When an auditor spends enough time to understand his/her client’s business and substantial test, the auditor can 
discover the client’s accounting mistakes and provide high audit quality. Also, when the auditor spends more time to 
audit, the auditor can reduce the magnitude of discretionary accruals, thereby resulting in a reduction in the change 
of earning management (Choi & Baek, 1998; Kwon et al., 2006; Caramanis & Lennox, 2008). Therefore, depending 
on audit time, audit qualities can be changed as well as the effects on the incidence rate of its client subject to 
AAERs. Therefore, we set the following hypothesis to test the relationship between audit time and the incidence of 
auditor’s client subject to AAREs. 
 
Hypothesis 2-1: Firms with longer audit time have significantly less incidence rate subject to AAER than firms 
with shorter audit time. 
 
There are two opposite perceptions regarding the relation between audit fee and audit quality. First, from 
the previous literatures, increased audit time leads to greater audit quality and results in a higher audit fee. An 
auditor charges higher audit fees for greater audit efforts, and greater effort leads to higher quality audits (Basioudis 
et al., 2008; Srinidhi & Gul, 2007; Kinney et al., 2004). Palmrose (1986) finds that Big 8 audit firms exhibited both 
higher audit fees and audit hours. Moreover, she concludes that Big 8 audit firms require a high audit fee because 
they conduct higher quality audits. In this case, in which high audit fee is related with high audit quality, when the 
company pays a high audit fee, we can be convinced that the auditor supplies a high quality of audit service. 
Therefore, we expect that when firms pay high audit fees, the firm has less incidence rate subject to AAERs than 
firm paying less audit fees. 
 
However, there is other point of view with regard to the audit fee and audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) posits 
that auditor independence can be impaired when the auditor receives a high audit fee from its client. When auditor 
independence is impaired, the auditor will be less likely to uncover and report its client’s irregularities and hence, 
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the audit quality will be impaired as well. Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) also posit that auditors are less likely to 
issue a qualified opinion when a client’s position is high in the auditor’s portfolio. It means that when auditor 
becomes more economically bonded with its client, auditor independence can be impaired. Therefore, when a firm 
pays a high audit fee to its auditor, we can interpret that that the high audit fee can impair the auditor’s independence 
and eventually, increases the incidence rate of its client subject to AAERs. Overall, there are two opposite 
expectations about the relationship between audit fee and the incidence rate subject to AAERs. To verify such 
relationship, we set the hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2-2: Audit fee significantly affects the incidence rate subject to AAERs. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 
 
We use the following models to examine Hypothesis 1, or the association between AAER and size of audit 
firm. The independent variables are described below. 
 
AAER=                                                             
                                              (1) 
 
where: 
 
AAER: an indicator variable with a value of one when a firm is in the KSFC (Korean Securities and Futures 
Commission) list of AAER and zero otherwise 
BIG4: an indicator variable that equals one when the auditor is Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise 
MEDIUM: an indicator variable that equals one when the auditor is medium auditor and zero otherwise 
SMALL: an indicator variable that equals one when the auditor is small auditor and zero otherwise 
AUDITOR: an ordinary variable that equals two when an auditor is BIG4, equals one when an auditor is MEDIUM, 
and equals zero when an auditor is SMALL 
OPN: an indicator variable that equals one when opinion on financial statement is non-unqualified and zero 
otherwise 
FIRST: an indicator variable with a value of one when there is an auditor change and zero otherwise 
SIZE: natural log of total asset 
LEV: total debt scaled by total asset 
LIQ: current asset scaled by current liability 
ROA: net income scaled by total asset 
LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one when if the net income is lower than zero and zero otherwise 
GRW: sales growth ratio 
MKT: an indicator variable that equals one when firm is listed on KOSDAQ and zero otherwise 
 
In Model (1), we divided the three groups depending on the size of the audit firm, Big 4, medium, and 
small. Our primary interest is in the sign and magnitude of the coefficient   . This assumes that the size of audit 
firms could affect the incidence rate of those clients subject to AAERs. Therefore, we expect that each of the 
independence variables, Big 4, medium, and small, have different effects on their clients subject to AAERs. Nine 
variables are in the model to control for the effects of audit qualities. First, we control the audit opinion and auditor’s 
tenure. Audit opinion reflects the quality of the financial statements. Therefore, depending on the audit opinion, 
clients have a difference incidence rate subject to AAERs. Also, we control the initial audit (FIRST). Donald R. et al. 
(1996) find that initial audits are associated with lower fees and higher quality as well as higher audit hours. Further, 
the client’s characteristics affect the financial statement quality. Becker et al. (1998) find that large clients (SIZE) are 
more likely to have higher earning qualities. Thus, we control the size of clients. Companies in financial distress or 
under near-debt constraints may be more motivated to manage their earnings (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). 
Therefore, we control some variables in order to affect the debt and financial distress: LEV, LIQ, ROA, LOSS, and 
GRW. 
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3.2 Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
We use the following regression model for the test of Hypothesis 2. 
 
AAER=                                                          
                                                           (2) 
 
where: 
 
ATIME: natural log of audit time 
AFEE: natural log of audit fee 
 
To test Hypothesis 2-1, our main explanatory variable is AIME. The dependent variable is AAER and the 
control variables are the same as those in Equation (1). Generally, previous literatures posit that high audit time 
leads to a positive relationship between audit qualities (Choi & Baek, 1998; Kwon et al., 2006; Caramanis & Lennox, 
2008). Based on those literatures, we expect that there are significant differences between AAERs firm’s audit time 
and non-AAERs firm’s audit time. 
 
To test Hypothesis 2-2, we use AFEE as an explanatory variable to examine the relationship between 
client’s audit fee and the incidence rate subject to AAERs in Model (2), instead of using ATIME. There are two 
opposite views with regard to the relationship between audit fee and audit quality. According to previous literatures, 
audit fees can be affected to impair the audit quality or to improve the audit quality. Therefore, we expect to have a 
positive or negative relationship between AFEE and AAER. 
 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC 
 
Table 1, Panel A reports the sample distribution by year. In 2002, FSS investigated 97 firms. 20 firms were 
in the list of AAER. In 2003, FSS investigated 91 firms, and 18.7% of firms were subject to AAERs. In 2002 and 
2003, the sample size and the ratio of AAERs are very similar. However, in 2004, FSS investigated 155 firms, and 
21 firms were subject to AAERs. In 2005, FSS investigated 226 firms, but only 22 firms were subject to AAERs. In 
2006, the total sample was 150 and only 8% of firms were subject to AAERs. During the 5 years, FSS has been 
observing 719 firms; only 7.17% of sample firms were subject to AAERs. Although the number of total sample of 
firms was increased, the ratio of subject to AAERs was gradually decreased. This implies that in the late 2000s, most 
companies are more concerned about the reliability of financial statement and reducing earnings management and 
frauds. 
 
In Table 1, Panel B, we present the sample distribution by the two-digit SIC code industry. The most 
heavily represented industry is Chemical & Allied production (14.77 percent), followed by Wholesale & Retail 
(10.23 percentage) and Electric Equipment (9.09 percent). 
 
Table 1: Sample Distribution by Year 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year 
Sample Size 
AAER Non-AAER 
2002 20 77 
2003 17 74 
2004 21 134 
2005 22 204 
2006 8 142 
Sub-total 88 631 
Total 719 
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Table 1 cont. 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry 
 
AAER Non-AAER 
Total 
 
# of obs 
% of 
AAER 
sample 
% of 
Total 
sample 
# of obs 
% of Non-
AAER 
sample 
% of 
Total 
sample 
Food, Beverage 3 3.41 0.35 46 6.01 5.39 49 
Apparel & Other Textiles Products 4 4.55 0.47 28 3.66 3.28 32 
Paper & Allied Products 1 1.14 0.12 23 3.01 2.70 24 
Chemical & Allied Products 13 14.77 1.52 102 13.33 11.96 115 
Rubber & Plastic Products 0 0.00 0.00 16 2.09 1.88 16 
Fabricated Metal Product 5 5.68 0.59 16 2.09 1.88 21 
Primary Metal Product 6 6.82 0.70 71 9.28 8.32 77 
Electronic & Machinery 6 6.82 0.70 77 10.07 9.03 83 
Electric Equipment 8 9.09 0.94 112 14.64 13.13 120 
Transportation Equipment 4 4.55 0.47 43 5.62 5.04 47 
Construction 5 5.68 0.59 30 3.92 3.52 35 
Transportation 2 2.27 0.23 15 1.96 1.76 17 
Wholesale & Retail 9 10.23 1.06 38 4.97 4.45 47 
Other 22 25.00 2.58 148 19.35 17.35 170 
Total 88 100.00 10.32 765 100.00 89.68 853 
 
Table 2, Panel A reports the descriptive data for our total sample. The mean (median) value of ATIME is 
6.236 (6.314) and the mean (median) value of AFEE is 17.805 (17.728). The reasons of AAERs are divided by the 
auditor’s fault and/or firm’s fault. According to our data, 8.0% of AAERs firm had auditor failure, 9.7% of AAERs 
firms with manager failure, and only 4.0% of firms had both failures. The mean (median) opinion is 0.009 (0.00), 
implying that about 0.9% of the financial statements in our total sample received a non-unqualified opinion. 54.3% 
of our total ample firms were audited by the BIG 4. 
 
Panel B reports the descriptive data for AAER firms, non-AAER firms and differences of AAER firms and 
non-AAER firms. The mean difference value of ATIME is -0.511(-0.402), and the mean difference value of AFEE is 
-0.167 (-0.160), implying that an AAERs firm’s auditor inputted significantly less time and received a significantly 
less audit fee than non-AAERs firm. 
 
The mean difference value of OPN is 0.015, which means that AAERs firms received more non-unqualified 
opinion than non-AAERs firms. The mean difference value of Big 4 is -0.212. When a firm is audited by the Big 4, 
it has a less incidence rate subject to AAERs. The mean (median) difference value of LEV is 0.083 (0.092) and the 
mean difference value of LIQ is -0.497. Further, the mean difference of ROA is -0.202 and the mean difference of 
Loss is 0.121. Therefore, from the mean difference of variables between AAER firms and non-AAER firms, we can 
realize that firms with a high debt ratio, low ROA, and high loss have higher incidence rate subject to AAERs 
compared to other firms. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Total Sample 
Variables Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
ATIME 6.236 5.858 6.314 6.762 0.989 
AFEE 17.805 17.342 17.728 18.172 0.735 
TIME(hours) 821.052 350.000 552.000 864.000 1,047.320 
FEE(million won) 76.029 34.000 50.000 78.000 94.388 
AAER 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.304 
AUDITOR 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.272 
CLIENT 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.296 
ACT 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.196 
OPN 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 
BIG4 0.543 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.498 
FIRST 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.428 
SIZE 25.479 24.405 25.204 26.292 1.464 
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Table 2 cont. 
LEV 0.440 0.287 0.439 0.588 0.203 
LIQ 2.226 0.981 1.548 2.701 2.099 
ROA -0.024 0.003 0.036 0.082 0.494 
LOSS 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.422 
GRW 0.122 -0.063 0.055 0.185 0.782 
MKT 0.504 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 
Panel B: AAER Sample and Non-AAER Sample 
 
AAER = 1 AAER = 0 Differences 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ATIME 5.754 5.955 6.265 6.356 -0.511*** -0.402*** 
AFEE 17.629 17.567 17.826 17.728 -0.197** -0.160*** 
OPN 0.023 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.015 0.000 
BIG4 0.352 0.000 0.565 1.000 -0.212*** -1.000*** 
FIRST 0.227 0.000 0.243 0.000 -0.016 0.000 
SIZE 25.033 24.908 25.530 25.264 -0.497*** -0.356*** 
LEV 0.515 0.521 0.432 0.429 0.083*** 0.092*** 
LIQ 1.780 1.336 2.277 1.575 -0.497*** -0.240** 
ROA -0.205 0.023 -0.003 0.038 -0.202** -0.015*** 
LOSS 0.341 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.121** 0.000** 
GRW 0.190 0.035 0.115 0.056 0.076 -0.021 
MKT 0.432 0.000 0.512 1.000 -0.081 -1.000 
Variable descriptions are as follows: ATIME: natural log of audit time; AFEE: natural log of audit fee; AAER: an indicator variable with a 
value of one when a firm is in the KSFC (Korean Securities and Futures Commission) list of AAER and zero otherwise; OPN: an indicator 
variable that equals one when opinion on financial statement is non-unqualified and zero otherwise; BIG4: an indicator variable that equals 
one when the auditor is Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise; FIRST: an indicator variable with a value of one when there is an auditor change 
and zero otherwise; SIZE: natural log of total asset; LEV: total debt scaled by total asset; LIQ: current asset scaled by current liability; ROA: 
net income scaled by total asset; LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one if the net income is lower than zero and zero otherwise; GRW: 
sales growth ratio; MKT: an indicator variable that equals one when firm is listed on KOSDAQ and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
Table 3 reports the correlation between various variables. ATIME and AAER, AFEE and AAER, and BIG4 
and AAER have a strong negative correlation. Also, the SIZE, LEV, LIQ, and ROA have a strong negative 
correlation with AAER. This implies that firms with AAER firm’s auditor receive less audit fee and spend less audit 
time. Firms, audited by the Big 4, have less incidence rate subject to AAER. However, firms with high LEV and 
ROA are highly related with AAERs. 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2014 Volume 30, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1321 The Clute Institute 
Table 3: Correlation between Variables 
 
AAER ATIME AFEE OPN BIG4 FIRST SIZE LEV LIQ ROA LOSS GRW MKT 
AAER 1.000 
            
ATIME -0.165
*** 1.000 
           
AFEE -0.081
** 0.750*** 1.000 
          
OPN 0.047 -0.047 0.005 1.000 
         
BIG4 -0.129
*** 0.344*** 0.313*** -0.057* 1.000 
        
FIRST -0.011 0.027 -0.032 0.030 0.088
*** 1.000 
       
SIZE -0.103
*** 0.642*** 0.816*** -0.086** 0.336*** -0.009 1.000 
      
LEV 0.124
*** 0.100*** 0.203*** 0.192*** 0.032 0.026 0.108*** 1.000 
     
LIQ -0.072
** -0.168*** -0.241*** -0.065* -0.058* 0.027 -0.226*** -0.605*** 1.000 
    
ROA -0.124
*** 0.130*** 0.066* -0.141*** 0.057* -0.076** 0.169*** -0.205*** 0.008 1.000 
   
LOSS 0.087
** -0.129*** -0.144*** 0.119*** -0.069** -0.005 -0.285*** 0.245*** 0.022 -0.367*** 1.000 
  
GRW 0.029 -0.048 -0.035 -0.062
* -0.021 0.020 -0.008 -0.007 -0.058* 0.012 -0.060* 1.000 
 
MKT -0.049 0.440
*** 0.517*** -0.049 0.200*** 0.050 0.574*** 0.048 -0.169*** 0.082** -0.160*** -0.031 1.000 
Variable descriptions are as follows: AAER: an indicator variable with a value of one when a firm is in the KSFC (Korean Securities and Futures Commission) list of AAER and zero otherwise; ATIME: 
natural log of audit time; AFEE: natural log of audit fee; OPN: an indicator variable that equals one when opinion on financial statement is non-unqualified and zero otherwise; BIG4: an indicator 
variable that equals one when the auditor is Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise; FIRST: an indicator variable with a value of one when there is an auditor change and zero otherwise; SIZE: natural log of 
total asset; LEV: total debt scaled by total asset; LIQ: current asset scaled by current liability; ROA: net income scaled by total asset; LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one if the net income is 
lower than zero and zero otherwise; GRW: sales growth ratio; MKT: an indicator variable that equals one when firm is listed on KOSDAQ and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed t
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
This section presents the results of the regression using the test and control variable for the full sample. 
Table 4 reports the logistic regression results of Hypothesis 1, that there is a relationship between the size of audit 
firms and the incidence rate of auditor’s client subject to AAERs. To verify this relationship, we split the accounting 
firms as BIG4, MEDIUM, and SMALL, depending on the size of accounting firms. Our interest variable in model (1) 
is BIG4, and the coefficient of Big 4 on AAER is -0.737 and significantly negative at the 1% level (t = 7.58). In 
model (2), the coefficient of MEDIUM is 0.335(t = 1.24) and insignificant. In model (3), the coefficient of SMALL 
is -0.355(t = 1.24) and insignificant. Such result implies that firms audited by the BIG 4 have significantly less 
incidence rates subject to AAERs. However, medium and small audit firms are not affected to reduce the incidence 
rate of those clients subject to AAERs. This result suggests that a company audited by the Big 4 is less likely subject 
to AAERs because the Big 4 engage in audits with more conservatism and provide better audit quality than medium 
or small size audit firms. This result is consistent with that of previous literatures, that the Big 4 provides higher 
quality than small audit firms by reporting lower abnormal and high earnings quality and greater accuracy (Jones, 
1991; Lennox, 1999; Dye, 1993; Francis & Yu, 2009). 
 
Table 4: Result for Hypothesis 1 
 
Dependent Variable (AAER) 
 
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) 
Intercept -3.451(0.00) -3.545(0.00) -3.19(0.00) 
BIG4 -0.737(7.58)
***
 
  
MEDIUM 
 
0.355(1.24) 
 
SMALL 
  
-0.355(1.24) 
AUDITOR 
   
OPN -0.484(0.24) -0.502(0.26) -0.502(0.26) 
FIRST 0.045(0.02) 0.063(0.04) 0.063(0.04) 
SIZE -0.235(4.00)
**
 -0.241(4.14)
**
 -0.241(4.14)
**
 
LEV 0.878(1.18) 0.979(1.44) 0.979(1.44) 
LIQ -0.147(2.38) -0.138(2.11) -0.138(2.11) 
ROA -0.287(1.95) -0.267(1.61) -0.267(1.61) 
LOSS 0.017(0) 0.022(0.00) 0.022(0.00) 
GRW 0.094(0.74) 0.089(0.65) 0.089(0.65) 
MKT -0.039(0.01) -0.039(0.01) -0.039(0.01) 
Year/Industry Included Included Included 
Likelihood ratio 101.71
***
 102.95
***
 102.95
***
 
Pseudu R
2
 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Sample Size 853 853 853 
Variable descriptions are as follows: AAER: an indicator variable with a value of one when a firm is in the KSFC (Korean Securities and Futures 
Commission) list of AAER and zero otherwise; BIG4: an indicator variable that equals one when the auditor is Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise; 
MEDIUM: an indicator variable that equals one when the auditor is medium auditor and zero otherwise; SMALL: an indicator variable that equals 
one when the auditor is small auditor and zero otherwise; OPN: an indicator variable that equals one when opinion on financial statement is non-
unqualified and zero otherwise; FIRST: an indicator variable with a value of one when there is an auditor change and zero otherwise; SIZE: natural 
log of total asset; LEV: total debt scaled by total asset; LIQ: current asset scaled by current liability; ROA : net income scaled by total asset; LOSS: 
an indicator variable that equals one if the net income is lower than zero and zero otherwise; GRW: sales growth ratio; MKT: an indicator variable 
that equals one when firm is listed on KOSDAQ and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
5.2 Results for Hypothesis 2 
 
Table 5, Model (1) reports the results of Hypothesis 2-1, which investigates the relationship with auditor’s 
effort (time) and the incidence rate of its client subject to AAER. We use audit time as a proxy to measure the 
auditor’s efforts. We expect that audit time and the incidence rate of subject to AAERs have a negative relationship. 
The estimate coefficient on ATIME is -0.345(t = 4.38) and has a significantly negative association with AAER at the 
5% level. Overall, the result suggests that an increase of audit time positively affects to improved audit quality and 
reduces the incidence rate subject to AAERs. This result supports our Hypothesis 2-1. 
 
Model (2) presents the result of Hypothesis 2-2. We expect both signals because there are two opposite 
views about the relation between audit fee and audit quality. However, in the results of Hypothesis 2-2, the estimate 
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coefficient on AFEE is 0.033(t = 0.01) and has an insignificant positive association with AAER. This result means 
that whether the audit fee is high or not, the audit fee is not affected by the incidence rate of client subject to AAERs. 
Although high audit time leads to high audit fee (Basioudis et al., 2008; Srinidhi & Gul, 2007; Kinney et al., 2004), 
audit firms are very competitive and therefore, there are some limitation for receiving a high audit fee according to 
audit time. Therefore, we believe that those competitive situations dilute the relationship between audit fee and 
AAERs. 
 
In conclusion, we use audit time and audit fee as proxies of measuring audit quality. However, only audit 
time is related with the incidence rate subject to AAERs. More specifically, AAERs firm’s auditor inputted 
significantly less audit time than non-AAERs firm’s auditor. However, there are no significant differences between 
non-AAERs firm’s audit fee and AAERs firm’s audit fee. From those results, even though the client firm has the 
responsibility to make a reliable financial statement, most client firms and managers lack the accounting knowledge 
and resources to make suitable financial statements. In fact, many companies rely on the auditor to create the 
financial statement as well as to take advice from the auditor before making any accounting decision or financial 
statement. By increasing the reliance on auditors, audit effort can be a more important factor for reducing the 
incidence rate of AAERs. Therefore, depending on the auditor’s effort, particularly audit time, the incidence rate of 
client subject to AAERs can be changed. 
 
Table 5: Result for Hypothesis 2 
 
Dependent Variable(AAER) 
Intercept -4.425(0.00) -3.743(0.00) 
ATIME -0.345(4.38)
 **
 
 
AFEE 
 
0.033(0.01) 
OPN -0.547(0.30) -0.501(0.25) 
BIG4 -0.670(6.11)
 **
 -0.739(7.59)
 ***
 
FIRST 0.057(0.034) 0.050(0.03) 
SIZE -0.119(0.82) -0.248(2.42) 
LEV 1.021(1.55) 0.866(1.12) 
LIQ -0.148(2.34) -0.147(2.39) 
ROA -0.221(1.11) -0.287(1.95) 
LOSS 0.087(0.07) 0.016(0.00) 
GRW 0.086(0.63) 0.094(0.75) 
MKT 0.036(0.013) -0.045(0.02) 
Year/Industry Included Included 
Likelihood ratio 106.036
***
 101.723
***
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.241 0.232 
Sample Size 853 853 
Variable descriptions are as follows: AAER: an indicator variable with a value of one when a firm is in the KSFC (Korean Securities and 
Futures Commission) list of AAER and zero otherwise; ATIME: natural log of audit time; AFEE: natural log of audit fee; OPN: an indicator 
variable that equals one when opinion on financial statement is non-unqualified and zero otherwise; BIG4: an indicator variable that equals 
one when the auditor is Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise; FIRST: an indicator variable with a value of one when there is an auditor change 
and zero otherwise; SIZE: natural log of total asset; LEV: total debt scaled by total asset; LIQ: current asset scaled by current liability; ROA: 
net income scaled by total asset; LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one if the net income is lower than zero and zero otherwise; GRW: 
sales growth ratio; MKT: an indicator variable that equals one when firm is listed on KOSDAQ and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Change of Audit Time and Audit Fee after Auditor’s Client Subject to AAERs 
 
The purposes of enforcement action are to improve accounting information as well as to reduce fraud and 
earnings management. However, the enforcement action is not an on-going process. Therefore, after an enforcement 
action, it is possible that AAERs firms do not improve the quality of financial statements because they already paid 
out the penalties and they will not be selected as AAERs sample in the near future. Therefore, we investigate the 
effectiveness of enforcement action by examining the change of audit time and audit fee after the auditor’s client are 
subject to AAERs. We already examine that when audit time is increased, audit quality will also be increased and 
hence, firms can reduce the incidence rate subject to AAERs. If enforcement action is a system to improve 
accounting information ex-postly, the auditor should be input more efforts after its client subject to AAERs. To 
investigate the change of auditor’s efforts, we use the following model. 
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∆ATIME (∆AFEE) =                                                  
                                                                     (3) 
 
where: 
 
∆ATIME changed value of natural log of audit time; 
∆AFEE changed value of natural log of audit fee 
∆AAER an indicator variable with a value of one when a firm is on the list of AAER in the previous year and zero 
otherwise 
 
First, we use ∆ATIME as a dependent variable and ∆AAER as an independent variable to examine the 
effectiveness of AAERs. We control ∆OPN, ∆BIG4, FIRST, ∆SIZE, ∆LEV, ∆LIQ, ∆LOSS, ∆GRW, and MKT, 
which affect the audit quality. When an auditor makes an engagement with AAERs firm, the auditor should be 
spending more time (efforts) to increase the audit quality for auditing more conservatively before its client are 
subject to AAERs. Therefore, we expect to have a positive relationship between ∆AAER and ∆ATIME if 
enforcement action works effectively. Also, to examine the association between ∆AAER and ∆AFEE, we use 
∆AFEE as a dependent variable. Even though there is an insignificant relationship between AFEE and AAERs in the 
results of Hypothesis 2, we expect that the auditor will spend more time to audit than before; moreover, increased 
audit time may lead to high audit fee after the client is subject to AAERs. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the relation between ∆AAER and ∆ATIME and ∆AAER and ∆AFEE. Model 
(1) presents the regression results using ∆ATIME as a dependent variable. The regression results, the coefficient of 
∆AAER is not significant. In contrast, the coefficient of ∆AFEE is 0.097(t = 2.63) and is significantly positive at the 
1% level, which is the same with our expectation. This means that after the auditor’s client is subject to AAERs, the 
auditor does not input more time to audit conservatively even though the auditor receives more audit fee as a risk 
premium than before, because the audit fee is a function of the auditor’s expected future losses arising primarily 
form the litigation risk (Simunic, 1980). In other words, it is interpreted that although enforcement action is a system 
to improve the reliability of accounting information by re-testifying the sample companies’ financial statements ex-
postly, this system is not effective for improving the reliability of financial statements by increasing the audit time. 
 
Table 6: Results for the Relationship Between Change of Audit Efforts (Fee and Time) and Change of AAER 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
∆ATIME ∆AFEE 
Intercept 0.071(0.20) 0.227(0.88) 
∆AAER 0.064(1.23) 0.097(2.63)
***
 
∆OPN -0.053(-0.36) -0.143(-1.41) 
∆BIG4 0.039(0.78) 0.069(1.94)
*
 
FIRST 0.018(0.71) -0.019(-1.05) 
∆SIZE 0.154(3.13)
***
 0.119(3.45)
***
 
∆LEV 0.311(2.64)
***
 -0.215(-3.58)
***
 
∆LIQ -0.003(-0.65) -0.004(-1.29) 
∆ROA 0.155(2.92)
***
 -0.153(-4.36)
***
 
∆LOSS 0.036(1.14) 0.007(0.35) 
∆GRW 0.007(0.80) -0.006(-0.97) 
MKT -0.006(-0.23) -0.035(-1.67)
*
 
Year/Industry Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.09 0.09 
F-Value 2.30
***
 2.35
***
 
Sample Size 678 678 
Variable descriptions are as follows: ∆ATIME: changed value of natural log of audit time; ∆AFEE: changed value of natural log of audit fee; 
∆AAER: an indicator variable with a value of one when a firm is in the list of AAER in the previous year and zero otherwise; ∆OPN: an 
indicator variable that equals one when opinion on financial statement is unqualified in the previous year and non-unqualified in the current 
year and zero otherwise; ∆BIG4: an indicator variable that equals one when the predecessor auditor is Non-Big 4 auditor and incoming 
auditor is Big 4 and zero otherwise; FIRST: an indicator variable with a value of one when there is an auditor change and zero otherwise; 
∆SIZE: changed value of natural log of total asset; ∆LEV : changed value of total debt scaled by total asset; ∆LIQ: changed value of current 
asset scaled by current liability; ∆ROA : changed value of net income scaled by total asset; ∆LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one if 
the net income is not lower than zero in the previous year and is lower than zero in current year and zero otherwise; ∆GRW: changed value 
of sales growth ratio; MKT: an indicator variable that equals one when firm is listed on KOSDAQ and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
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6.2 Cause of AAERs and the Degree of Penalties 
 
AAERs provide a varying degree of detail on the nature of misconduct, whether those misconduct is due to 
auditor or clients. Bremser et al. (1991) posit that about 2/3 of AAERs firms have reasons of officer’s misconduct. 
However, 1/3 of AAERs firms have reasons of officer’s misconduct and auditor’s failure. This means that even 
though the auditor audited its client’s financial statement by complying with GASS, one-third of AAERs firm still 
conduct misconducts. During audit periods, the auditor needs to follow the systematic process of objectively 
obtaining and evaluate evidence. Then based on its works, the auditor gives assertions about the economic actions 
and events and provides reasonable assurance, not absolute assurance, that the financial statement is free of material 
misstatements. Therefore, when the auditor reports an unqualified opinion, it does not mean that the unqualified 
financial statement has no material mistakes. Therefore, we examine the difference of auditor’s effort depending on 
the cause of AAERs. Table 7, Model (1) represents the result of the relationship between ATIME and the cause of 
AAERs with the auditor. The coefficient of AUDITOR is -0.229 (t = -2.61) and is significant at the 1% level. In 
Model (2), the coefficient of CLIENT is -0.149 (t = -1.82) and is significant at the 10% level. This means that when 
the cause of AAERs is an auditor, the auditor spends significantly less time to audit compared to other AAERs firm’s 
auditor. From this result, we conclude that whether the cause of AAERs is the auditor or not, depending on audit 
time, firms can reduce the incidence rate subject to AAERs and ultimately, good accounting information can be 
released to the public. 
 
Table 7: Cause of AAERs and the Degree of Penalties 
 
Dependent Variable (ATIME) 
Intercept -2.937(-5.34)
*** -2.966(-5.37)*** -2.653(-3.07)*** 
AUDITOR -0.229(-2.61)
***   
CLIENT  -0.149(-1.82)
 *  
ACT   -0.109(-2.04)
** 
OPN 0.039(0.16) 0.078(0.32) 0.081(0.33) 
BIG4 0.214(4.25)
*** 0.219(4.35)*** 0.218(4.33)*** 
FIRST -0.031(-0.54) -0.030(-0.53) -0.022(-0.39) 
SIZE 0.333(15.36)
*** 0.333(15.36)*** 0.334(15.41)*** 
LEV 0.260(1.64) 0.258(1.62) 0.276(1.73)
* 
LIQ -0.004(-0.27) -0.004(-0.26) -0.004(-0.25) 
ROA 0.142(2.75)
*** 0.133(2.57)** 0.134(2.57)** 
LOSS 0.105(1.63) 0.104(1.61) 0.115(1.78)
* 
GRW -0.042(-1.42) -0.047(-1.59) -0.043(-1.46) 
MKT 0.189(3.20)
*** 0.186(3.15)*** 0.189(3.19)*** 
Year/Industry Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.51 
F-value 29.32
*** 29.08*** 28.85*** 
Sample Size 88 88 88 
Variable descriptions are as follows: ATIME: natural log of audit time; AFEE: natural log of audit fee; AUDITOR: an indicator variable 
with a value of one when AAER is subject to auditor and zero otherwise; CLIENT: an indicator variable with a value of one when AAER is 
subject to client company and zero otherwise; ACT: an indicator variable that equals one when strong action subsequent to AAER is 
imposed and zero otherwise; OPN : an indicator variable that equals one when opinion on financial statement is non-unqualified and zero 
otherwise; BIG4: an indicator variable that equals one when the auditor is Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise; FIRST: an indicator variable 
with a value of one when there is an auditor change and zero otherwise; SIZE: natural log of total asset; LEV: total debt scaled by total asset; 
LIQ: current asset scaled by current liability; ROA : net income scaled by total asset; LOSS: an indicator variable that equals one if the net 
income is lower than zero and zero otherwise; GRW: sales growth ratio; MKT: an indicator variable that equals one when firm is listed on 
KOSDAQ and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed 
test. 
 
After FSS releases the list of AAERs firm, FSS imposes penalties to AAERs firms and/or its auditor 
depending on the degree of misconducts by using quantitatively as well as qualitatively information. We divided 
AAERs firms into two groups depending on the degree of imposed penalties. When FSS offers a piece of advice to 
AAERs firm, such as dismiss of officer, change auditor or charge an officer, we define that those actions belong to 
severe punishment (ACT). When a firm is imposed with a severe punishment (ACT), it means that the firm has more 
serious misconduct on its financial statement and otherwise, the firm’s auditor provides lower quality service in 
order to not detect the client’s misconducts. Therefore, depending on the degree of punishment, we investigate the 
auditor’s effort. We expect that when a firm’s punishment belongs to severe punishment, its firm’s inputted audit 
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time is significantly less than that of other AAERs-firms. Therefore, we test that auditor’s efforts and AAERs firm, 
which is imposed with severe punishment. In Model (3), the coefficient of ACT is -0.019 (t = -2.04) and is 
significant at the 10% level. This means that when AAERs firm is imposed with a severe punishment, even though 
AAERs firm have intended earnings management by the manager or not, the audit time is significantly less than that 
of other AAERs firms, which is not classified as a serious act. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we examine the relation between auditor’s characteristics and the incidence rate of its client 
subject to AAERs. First, we examine the relation between the incidence rate of its client subject to AAERs and the 
size of audit firm. We find that when a firm is audited by the Big 4, the firm has a significant less incidence rate 
subject to AAERs. This is a reasonable result because according to previous literature, the Big 4 provides better 
audit quality than small audit firm. Second, we examine the relationship between the incidence rate subject to 
AAERs and audit efforts by using audit time and audit fee as a proxy for audit efforts. We find that an increase of 
audit time significantly reduces the incidence rate subject to AAERs. However, audit fee does not affect the 
incidence rate subject to AAERs. Given the results, we posit that depending on the auditor’s characteristics, such as 
size of audit firm and audit time, its client have a different incidence rate subject to AAERs. 
 
Additionally, we also examine the effectiveness of AAERs, We find that although the auditor significantly 
receives a higher audit fee after its client is subject to AAERs, the auditor does not input more audit time than before. 
This means that the auditor receives a higher audit fee than before as a premium risk fee even though the auditor 
does not input more audit time to audit the client’s financial statement. Finally, we examine the difference of audit 
time depending on the cause of AAERs. We find that whether the cause of AAERs is the auditor or not, the auditor 
spends significantly less time at the time of auditing the client’s financial statement 
 
This study makes four main contributions. First, we focus on the characteristics of the auditor auditing an 
AAERs firm, and examine the reasons of AAERs, not the client’s characteristics. Through this investigation, we 
provide evidence that AAERs is not the only fault of AAERs firm, but that there is a lack of auditor’s efforts. Second, 
we investigate the change of audit time and fee after the auditor’s client is subjects to AAERs in order to examine 
the effectiveness of AAERs. Third, many previous literatures examine the company’s characteristic and market 
reaction at the time of disclosing AAERs information to the public. Normally, the results of AAERs are disclosed 3 
years later after the firms release their financial statements. In this study, instead of using the enforcement released 
date, we roll back to the time of issuing financial statements for providing accurate evidence of the auditor’s 
influence of possibility subject to its client’s AAERs. Lastly, FSS discloses only the list of firms that are subject to 
AAERs. For this reason, in previous literatures, AAERs firms are compared with firms randomly selected by the 
authors. However, as we use the same sample with FSS’s AAERs sample, we provide more accurate results of our 
examination compared to others. 
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